Viceroy's Attitude |
The Viceroy was seriously seized of the political atmosphere in the country. It was indeed a developing political problem which occupied much of his attention. He began to consider 'Gandhi and Co. being too much troublesome and in a telegram to the Secretary of State on 17th March, 1930, he explained, 'The lull in open political activities reported therein has continued in most parts of India .... The official programme (of Gandhi) is to develop the campaign in successive stages. The first stage has begun with Gandhi's march; the second is to begin after his arrest with a widening of the campaign, and the third stage is to be a mass campaign on a wide scale.'1
The senior government officials and the experts of the Government of India did not take the breach of salt tax seriously. They did not expect any kind of result damaging to the working of the British Government. George Richard Frederick Tottenham, a member of the Central Board of Revenue, described it 'as Mr. Gandhi's somewhat fantastic project.' Section 117 of the Indian Penal Code, under which Gandhi's arrest was proposed, being bailable, there was nothing to prevent him from continuing to march if he chose to be bailed out. In the event of his arrest, the government of Bombay had always been disposed to think that a long sentence would be preferable. 'If Gandhi should go on hunger strike, he must be released rather than allowed to die in custody. A short sentence would have no value.'4 During the week, prior to the historic march, The Times of India had assumed a hard line on Gandhi similar to that of Irwin and Sykes.5 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's arrest on 7 March was applauded and quoted favourable from British press statements calling for Gandhi's arrest.6
However, the call for severe
legal action against Gandhi, including his immediate arrest, was not nearly as
affirmative and unanimous as the above accounts might indicate, either in the
Government or in the English language press. In many circles, there was
ambivalence and confusion. Lord Irwin obviously had not made up his mind, for he
did not order Gandhi's arrest until almost two months after his Dandi march.
He noted that
the march had caused 'great excitement', substantial resignation of Patels, and
recruitment of volunteers in Ahmedabad, Kaira, Broach and Surat. It had
attracted large crowds on the route. To him land revenue resistance seemed
imminent. He, therefore, outlined a few options open to the government from
arrest and long imprisonment of Gandhi to indifference towards the whole
campaign. He laid stress on the urgent need for a firm statement of Government's
intentions as he was convinced that Gandhi's action would soon undermine
government's authority in Bombay.
In this autobiography, Sykes stated, 'Both, Master, the Collector of Kaira, and Garratt, the Commissioner of the Northern Division, were anxious to put an end to the march altogether. From the outset they thought that Gandhi was being given too much rope and that the policy of allowing him to make himself ridiculous was based on a fallacy. After about a month of the historic march, Gandhi addressed a letter to Lord Irwin on 4 May 1930 and apprised him of his programme of setting out for Dharasana along with his companions, demanding possession of the salt works. The daily reports of brutal police assaults on satyagrahis in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, U.P., Bombay, Delhi, Madras, Peshawar and Karachi prompted him to state, 'Bones have been broken, private parts have been squeezed for the purpose of making volunteers give up, to the Government valueless, to the volunteers precious salt...... Paddy fields are reported to have been burnt, eatables forcibly taken. 10
'But I would
fain avoid the further step. I would therefore ask you to remove the tax which many of your illustrious countrymen have
condemned in unmeasured terms and which, as you could not have failed to observe, has
evoked universal
protest and resentment expressed in civil disobedience. may condemn civil
disobedience as much as you like... Under these circumstances, Gandhi's arrest seemed imminent. The Viceroy had no intention to allow a legend to grow up that Gandhi could be arrested. He knew that it might soon have to be done, but he was anxious to defer it as long as possible. He informed the Secretary of State, in month of April, 'I am quite certain that we have been right so far not to arrest Gandhi and I am equally certain that he and his friends are greatly disappointed that we have not done so. 12 He was, however, conscious that his action in not arresting Gandhi was 'very illogical' but he was sure that it had helped the Government. He thought that Gandhi's plans at that time were uncertain but it was evident that he did not intend to remain immobilized on the sea-shore.13 He therefore, wrote to the Governor of Madras on 14 April 1930....... we must constantly be on guard against allowing the legend to establish itself that we were afraid of him or that he is unarrestable.'14 The Secretary of State expressed his concern at the political developments in India in his letter to Irwin On 22 April. He was sure that' ... if Gandhi were arrested and disorder followed, it would become merged in the terrorist organization and thereby strengthen it. 15 Two day later, the Viceroy informed the Secretary of State,'........ we are consulting Sykes and other local Governments again as to what they think about it ..... On the whole ...... the situation is difficult, but not critical.'16 Irwin's ambivalence on the issue of Gandhi's arrest was resolved, it seems, by Sykes' increasing alarm and Macolm Halley's intervention. 17 The latter was perhaps the most trusted adviser in the small group the Irwin liked to call his 'wise men'. At first, he himself had been ambivalent on the question, offering as he later recalled,' a compromise of differing views. However, he supported Irwin's reluctance to arrest Gandhi and Irwin cited Halley's support in his correspondence home. But on 25 April, with the unrest increasing rapidly, Halley finally came down hard for Gandhi's arrest, and, in a letter to Irwin, advised that they had already waited too long and should act speedily now? 18 This advice finally removed Irwin's ambivalence. He informed the Secretary of State on the same day. 'My own mind is moving, I think, towards arrest.'19 He also informed C. F. Andrews, ....... I cannot bring myself to understand how he (Gandhi) has been right to throw away what seemed a golden opportunity for men of goodwill to work together in favour of this movement with all its inevitable consequences.20 It was at length decided that Gandhi should be apprehended under Regulation XXV of 1927 which allowed persons engaged in unlawful activities to be placed under surveillance at the discretion of the authorities.21
By this means it was expected that the excitement, anger, agitation and demonstrations engendered by a public trial would be avoided. |